As New Zealand re-assert themselves at the top of rugby’s world order with a weekend victory over Ireland, Geraint Powell compares the regional structure beneath that success with the version here in Wales. As in fixtures between the two countries, Wales don’t really come out on top.
It was perhaps fitting that the All Backs 18 match winning run was ended by Ireland in Chicago on 5 November, the northern hemisphere country closest in structural/systemic design to New Zealand. Provincial, but not regional. Central contracts, but not universal central contracts across the 4 provincial squads. Representative, but no controlled private equity (as yet). But still the nearest the Northern Hemisphere has to the ultra efficient New Zealand professional rugby system. Strategically overseen by David Nucifora.
Of course the All Blacks extracted their revenge last night in Dublin, as was expected. No complaints after Chicago about their injury crisis at lock, losing Sam Whitelock, Brodie Retallick and Luke Romano for that one and the experiment of Jerome Kaino at lock failing abysmally. No excuses that the talismanic Aaron Smith might not have been in the best place mentally at Soldier Field, in the fallout from an ill-advised visit to an airport washroom with “a lady friend”. But the ultimate compliment for Irish rugby, the All Blacks playing on the absolute edge last night, in their ruthless niggly “win at all costs” mode. A match they simply could not afford to lose.
The clocks have been turned back one hour for winter rugby in the UK. My Australian friends at university used to like joking that Qantas captains would remind Australian passengers disembarking in Auckland or in Wellington not to forget to turn back their watches by at least a decade before disembarking the aircraft. This was New Zealand, the edge of the world and stuck in the past. When it comes to rugby union, members of the rugby fraternity landing in New Zealand would be better advised to always adjust their watches forward by a decade.
New Zealand rugby was professional a decade before rugby union was a professional sport. And true professionalism is as much a state of mind as a financial payment. Those of you of a certain vintage will recollect All Blacks captain Andy Dalton advertising tractors on TV in the mid-1980s, to the horror of the Home Unions in the British Isles. Not advertising them because he was an All Black mind you, for that would professionalise him and ban him from rugby union for life under then IRB Regulations, but because he was “a farmer”. And out of all the “farmers” in New Zealand, the tractor manufacturer just happened to accidentally select the one to advertise their product who was coincidentally the captain of the All Blacks! It makes Richie McCaw’s later pushing of the boundaries of the laws at the breakdown look positively amateurish in comparison.
I discussed in general terms the NZ regional rugby franchise system (link) following the 2015 Super Rugby final, 5 new regions above the historic 27 (now 26 – see below) rugby provinces of NZ rugby. I looked at New Zealand rugby a year on, during which they retained the World Cup and were favourites to retain the Super Rugby title (link). This was duly accomplished, in 2016 by the Hurricanes region (link).
Canterbury domestically retained their provincial title in 2016, defeating Tasman 43-27 in an upper South Island final from within the Crusaders region. That is now 8 provincial titles in 9 seasons, an incredible record. I have always been a huge fan of the Canterbury and Crusaders culture, for the Crusaders region operates primarily within the Canterbury provincial environment, arguably the greatest non-Test rugby culture on the planet.
The beaten finalists were Tasman, the sort of phenomenon that could not happen in Welsh rugby, for there was no real historic upper South Island rivalry. Canterbury historically dominant over the 6 smaller unions within the now Crusaders region. But in 2006, when the 1976 created provincial championship for the 27 provinces was modernised into a number of divisions, the Marlborough and Nelson Bays provincial unions decided to combine and become Tasman. The provincial numbers were evened out at 26, and Tasman got to dine at the top table of provincial rugby.
And they are dining very well indeed, coached by former Crusader and All Black Leon McDonald. Not just Ospreylia enjoying strength in amalgamation. If this was in Wales, we would be nowhere on amalgamation and still arguing about the uniquely rich and distinct “heritage” of Marlborough and Nelson Bays which it would be “commercial madness” to ditch. But a West Walian interest in the match. Kieron Fonotia played for Tasman, now at the Ospreys. Johnny McNichol kicked the ball out of play for Canterbury to end the match. He is now at the Scarlets.
It used to be a 2 way exercise. Garin Jenkins and Kevin Moseley going to NZ provinces, the likes of Sean Lineen and Dean Oswald coming the other way to Pontypool in the Eastern valley of Gwent. Nowadays it is 1 way traffic, the days of Welsh players improving themselves by spending a season in NZ long gone. It is now a one way direction of travel for coaches and players.
One of the greatest obstacles in conveying why the Welsh system of “regions” is so abjectly poor is that, in a historically national club rugby culture, many Welsh fans simply do not understand the fundamentals of a representative provincial or regional rugby model and so also have no “good” system of regions in their minds against which to compare our problems and shortcomings.
So we have seen above, from Andy Dalton and his tractors, New Zealand rugby was well ahead of the curve heading into the 1990s. And, surprise surprise, the NZRU managed the transition into the professional era in 1995 very smoothly. It acted in unison with the unions in Australia and South Africa to secure contractual control of the Southern Hemisphere players (and all at the central level in New Zealand) and teams, in securing and prioritising the greatest brand in rugby union (the All Blacks), in building successful competition platforms (Tri-Nations – now the Rugby Championship – and Super Rugby), in plugging into the larger Australian and South African television markets, and in constructing a season that maximised player development and welfare.
Compare with what happened in the Northern Hemisphere, or what did not happen at the union level to be more precise. If a Welsh rugby fan had to put forward his watch a decade in 1994 upon landing in New Zealand, 15 years might have been more prudent by 1997.
New Zealand has progressed internally with a minimum of internal disruption. The All Blacks have won 14 of the 21 Rugby Championships from 1996, and New Zealand teams have won 14 of the 21 Super Rugby tournaments. So, in both tournaments/competition platforms, that is exactly twice as many as Australia and South Africa combined.
New Zealand moved from “lead” provinces to full “province neutral” regions for Super Rugby in 2000. Every province, fan and blade of Kiwi grass represented by one of the Blues, Chiefs, Crusaders, Highlanders and Hurricanes regions. The greatest provincial brands in world rugby, the greatest non-Test brands anywhere, such as Auckland and Canterbury, jettisoned in an instant, unfit for purpose going forwards as regions to represent historically rival provinces and their fan bases. Compare with Welsh rugby, if you wish to depress yourself. Stand alone club “regions”, an intellectual absurdity.
So the teething issues in New Zealand have been trifling, at least by Northern Hemisphere standards of major conflict and dislocation. Yes, the downgrading of the provinces has been painful for many (despite inclusive new regions). Just as it has been for the WRU Premiership clubs in Wales, to an even greater extent. There is no real way to cushion that pain, to recognise that New Zealand and Wales can only afford 4 of 5 pro teams at most and the old vehicles of any of the 27 provinces and 18 1st class clubs respectively were unfit for purpose in this new professional era of the sport.
A tendency to choke at World Cups, especially against the French, that only ended in 2011. Tweaking of the player market between regions, the franchise contracting market and the methods to combat player hoarding. Taranaki being dissatisfied with the Hurricanes region and re-aligning with the Chiefs region. Financial mismanagement at the Otago province, the NZRU reluctant to abandon moral hazard, leading to a delayed “privatisation” of the Highlanders franchise. But generally little disruption and certainly no major damaging negative upheaval.
But what is amazing about the NZRU professional system, given that New Zealand is a small country, has been its resilience to external pressures. New Zealand rugby might not be missing much, but it is certainly missing hard currency and logic would dictate that New Zealand should have been badly falling away over the last decade and the reverse has happened because of the underlying sound structures. Lost players are mostly successfully replaced before their aircraft have even landed at Charles de Gaulle, Heathrow or Narita.
And significant external pressures. The player inflation surplus and player development shortfall in Europe, especially in England and France due to their unregulated club system and in recent years super fuelled by transient duopoly broadcaster conflicts (BT Sport v Sky Sports, Canal+ v beIN). The weakening of South African rugby, with implications for shared competition platforms, due to internal poor governance, racial politics/quotas and a declining “Africanised” currency amongst other factors. The weakening of Australian rugby, again with implications for shared competition platforms, due to over extension in a brutal winter sports market and also acquisitive European club pressures that were not correctly identified before bravely expanding into Perth and Melbourne just before beIN and BT Sport arrived on the scene and drove up the revenue/cost bases in Europe.
No offence is intended towards any individual player, but you have to basically ask 4 or 5 questions about every NZ player that comes to Europe: (1) Is he a mercenary, primarily driven more by money (or the ridiculous 3 year opportunity to play Test rugby, if not good enough for the All Blacks) rather than sporting excellence? (2) Is he after a life experience, with rugby now secondary? (3) Why has he decided that he no longer is or shortly will not be good enough for the All Blacks? (4) Why has he decided that he will never make the grade as an All Black? (5) If he is still good enough for the All Blacks, why is he topping-up his pension now? Sport is fine margins, too fine sometimes where the striving for betterment and drive is no longer within an individual player. That being said, proper marquee imports from New Zealand rarely flop without a medical/injury condition.
The New Zealand rugby season is nowadays split in two, between Super Rugby and the concurrent Rugby Championship Test/Mitre 10 provincial tournaments. Core All Blacks seldom appear in the provincial tournament nowadays, just as the similarly downgraded Currie Cup provincial tournament in South Africa sees few core Springboks. Not an optimal use of limited Test player game time. The only disruption is in June, when Super Rugby has to break to accommodate the touring Northern Hemisphere Test teams in June. New Zealand would obviously prefer an October-June professional rugby season in Europe, with Test teams visiting in July after the completion of Super Rugby but before the commencement of the Rugby Championship. One of a number of tensions at the heart of the global season debate (link)(link).
So what is the NZ regions system, since the decision to allow closely regulated external investors into the sport on renewable 5-7 year franchises from 2013. I prepared this crib sheet some time ago, for @markyiverson, and you can see the differences with the sub-optimal/defective hybrid system of regions in Wales. Welsh rugby essentially has an unhappy and unsuited “super” club model branded as “regions”. Only Neath/Swansea adopted a new regional profile, Ospreylia, albeit with by far the most success, and albeit that Llanelli were always the regional 1st class club for much of Dyfed’s rugby fraternity.
So, in order that we can see how superior the NZRU regional rugby system is, what are the differences with the Welsh regional rugby system and so enabling us to identify the shortcomings of the latter?
(1) NZ rugby’s pyramid is based on central strategic control, to try and enable a small country to punch far above its natural financial weight. It both recognises the supremacy of the Test team and the feeder role requirements from a successful integrated Super Rugby regional supply chain. Compare with Welsh rugby, where the Test team is not underpinned by what is a disjointed mess of a nominally independent and non-aligned regional supply chain that is often in open or simmering conflict with the WRU.
(2) NZ rugby’s pyramid is founded upon commercial reality, the recognition that the NZRU is best placed to plug into domestic and foreign broadcasters. Not any local shareholder/s in Dunedin or Hamilton. The NZRU has a relationship with Sky NZ, and through them and SARU/ARU with Naspers of South Africa and Fox of Australia. Compare with Welsh rugby, where the BBC/S4C have a commercial relationship with the WRU. Sky primarily have a commercial relationship with the RFU and the IRFU, and the English clubs have a commercial relationship with BT. The nominally independent regions have to try and plug into somebody else’s commercial relationship with a broadcaster, having no broadcaster of their own. A difficult task, as evidenced by BT not even bothering to televise either the Blues v Ospreys or the Dragons v Scarlets Anglo-Welsh Cup matches this weekend.
(3) NZ rugby is not founded on any nominal independence lie. It is a totality, with ultimate NZRU control and where each tier is to do its best subject to subservience to the needs of the tier above. Compare with Welsh rugby, where the WRU, Ospreys, Scarlets, Blues and Dragons each do their own thing subject to contractual restrictions. The current contract is the Rugby Services Agreement 2014. It is perhaps better described as an “armistice”, such is the general level of mistrust within Welsh rugby.
(4) The NZ pyramid is based on inclusivity, because exclusivity comes at an unaffordable cost in a small country. The Test team neutrally represents 5 regions, which themselves neutrally represent 26 historic provinces (inclusive of the Tasman merger). Each province neutrally represents its clubs. When regions teams were created in NZ, new provincial neutral points of shared identity were created. Provincial unions were encouraged to take an equity stake in their region. You don’t hear “I will never be a Blue” in Northland or North Harbour, whatever the level of engagement with the Auckland-HQ’d region.
Compare with Welsh rugby where some of our “regions” are pathetically bogged down in preserving damaging pre-regional era sectional 1st class club heritage. Cardiff versus Pontypridd, the Newport part of Gwent versus the rest of Gwent, the coastal plain versus the Valleys, South Wales versus North Wales. It would be infantile, even if it was not so damaging to Welsh rugby in commercial and rugby terms. Reflected in low popular support and even lower “crowds” (if you believe the numbers attending fall within the definition of “crowd” in the context of the financial requirements of professional sport).
(5) The NZ pyramid recognises that the NZRU is the party best suited to negotiate player contracts, to value all players relative to each other, and to prevent player stockpiling. A system that inherently prevents player inflation at the domestic level, especially in relation to players desiring and capable of playing Test rugby. And one that also recognises that the NZRU is the body with the money to spend on preventing the loss of critical players to wealthier overseas countries. Every regional rugby player is on a full central contract. Compare with Welsh rugby, where we have an unsuited free for all mitigated only by limited WRU assistance by means of National Dual Contracts or NDCs, a uniquely Welsh form of dual central contract with union primacy. One which does not even seek to control and regulate the wider player market, the primary role of a successful central contract system. Simply tinkering at the margins, to try and minimise damage to the Test team. Or “fiddling whilst Rome burns”, if you prefer.
(6) The NZRU regions are remarkably free of dogma and ideology and tailored to meet the unique requirements of each region. There is just a pragmatic clear demarcation between what is best done at the national level and what is best done at the devolved regional level and a requirement to represent all potential consumers. The Crusaders franchise is 100% owned by a consortium of provincial unions (with a non-equity benefactor director as guarantor, the coal baron Brent Francis), whereas the Highlanders franchise is 77% owned by private investors. The other three are somewhere in between. Five distinct franchise ownership structures that meet devolved requirements. 4 of the 5 regions reached the play-offs of 2016 Super Rugby, despite taking points off each other in the numerous domestic matches. Compare with Welsh rugby, where regional thinking rarely expands beyond replicating the inefficient soccer club model. The governance in Dyfed and East Glamorgan particularly anachronistic and unsuited for regional rugby in the 21st century.
(7) By ultimately retaining control of the regions, through franchising out to provincial unions and/or private investors for a fixed period, the NZRU is able to impose meaningful KPIs (key performance indicators). If NZ private investors succeed, their franchise will be extended. If NZ private investors fail, there is a natural cut-off point before others can take over and see if they can do better. Compare with Welsh rugby, where we have a no WRU disincentives to on-field or off-field regional failure. No meaningful KPIs. Just entrenched vested interests seeking little more than to prevent change to the cartel and to preserve their nominal independence.
(8) Finally, the NZRU appointment of and the payment of the regional head coaches enables them to impose consistent playing styles across the 5 regions in preparation for Test requirements. Compare with Welsh rugby, where some of the regions have decidedly different playing styles. Some Welsh fans complain about “Warrenball”, itself a limited style maximising a limited but physical skill set from a sub-optimal supply chain with hemisphere level success between 2008-13, but do not ask why the “second five eighths” footballer candidates capable of facilitating a more expansive style of play from the 12 jersey have been lost by the Welsh regions – Owen Williams (Leicester), Gavin Henson (Bristol), James Hook (Gloucester)? Whilst the regions themselves have filled up their 12 jerseys with players unqualified to play for Wales e.g. Josh Matavesi, Hadley Parkes, Rey Lee-Lo.
These are the real reasons why Welsh rugby is off the pace, and there is no point in just superficially calling for quick fix changes such as the kneejerk sacking of the caretaker head coach and the assistant/forwards coach. And I say this as someone who personally would have preferred them both replaced after the 2015 World Cup, a matter inevitably complicated by the likelihood that Warren Gatland would coach the 2017 Lions and would be on sabbatical 2016-17.
We have to confront in 2020 the long-term deep rooted structural/systemic problems in the WRU pyramid, otherwise it is just a case of managed decline.
As for the 2016 Welsh Autumn Internationals campaign, I shall discuss that next week in the context of the Welsh rugby media’s failure to adapt over 21 years to the professional era of rugby union and, with only a few notable exceptions at times, the lamentable inability to hold all parties in the professional game to account.
For many of the WRU pyramid failings in the 1995-2016 era should not have happened if there had been any meaningful media scrutiny.
This article appears courtesy of The VietGwent – a Welsh rugby blog. https://thevietgwent.wordpress.com/2016/11/20/27-what-is-the-new-zealand-rugby-professional-regions-system-and-why-is-it-so-damned-superior-to-the-welsh-rugby-professional-regions-system/